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3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to empirically test whether fiscal adjust-
ments can contribute to smoothing economic fluctuations. It is well known
that there have been two competing views on this issue, one of which—
known as Keynesian—emphasizes the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy, and
the other of which—the so-called new classical school—refutes it on the
grounds of the crowding-out eﬀect and Ricardian equivalence. Consider-
ing that these two conflicting arguments stem from the emphasis on the dif-
ferent perceptions of reality (such as the bounded rationality and finite
lives of economic agents), it would be more appropriate to do an empirical
analysis rather than continue theoretical debates.
This research mainly concerns a trajectory of GDP induced by vari-
ations in fiscal expenditure and taxation policy.1 We estimate three vari-
able vector autoregression (VAR) models or structural VAR models with
Korean fiscal data in order to measure the magnitudes of fiscal multipliers
dynamically following changes in fiscal expenditure and taxation. How-
ever, the quarterly Korean fiscal and GDP data (covering from 1979 Q1 to
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1. In discussing the validity of fiscal policy in reigning business cycles, the importance of
timeliness matters as much as the directions of policy eﬀects due to the presence of policy
time lags. To rephrase, the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy would not be achieved unless it is well
synchronized with the changes in the economic environments. However, it would constitute
another paper beyond the scope of this one to evaluate the stabilizing function of fiscal 
policy.
2000 Q4) reveal that expansive fiscal policy has no significant or substan-
tial eﬀect on boosting the economy.
In order to check the robustness of our results, we assign diﬀerent com-
binations of identifying restrictions on the disturbances of the tested
SVAR systems and measure the corresponding fiscal multipliers. Shock
identification strategies are elected based on the institutional aspect of fis-
cal activities (i.e., how the government reacts to business cycles by means
of controlling the size of tax revenues and expenditures). Observing how
the estimated values of fiscal multipliers vary with respect to the restric-
tions, we find that the estimated fiscal multipliers of Korea decay very fast
in addition to their small size and low statistical significance.
Then, considering the dependency of Korean economy on the foreign
sector, we extend the three variable SVARs to four variable ones by adding
a variable reflecting external shocks. Results from the four variable SVARs
confirm those from the three variable models while the significance of the
eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy is generally enhanced.
The contents of the paper are organized as follows. Section 3.2 surveys
the relevant literature (from both Korean and foreign sources) on the issue.
Section 3.3 introduces an analytical tool of the paper, basically a SVAR
system. Started from the usual Cholesky decomposition, we extend the
setup to include other strategies of identification borrowed from Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002) and Koh (2002). Section 3.4 provides empirical re-
sults from applying the methodologies defined in section 3.3 to the case of
Korea. Finally, section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature
Currently available literature on the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy is easily
classified into two groups by methodologies. The first group of papers cali-
brates a general equilibrium model and provides either comparative statics
or a transitional path in response to variations in fiscal stance of the gov-
ernment. The use of the general equilibrium setup is desirable for its inter-
nal consistency. However, it cannot provide an exact closed-form solution.
Thus, inevitably it resorts to diverse numerical techniques to get a solution.
On the other hand, the second group of papers estimate a reduced equa-
tion or a system of reduced equations liking fiscal variables with GDP or a
component of income identity (for example, aggregate consumption).2 In
return for its relatively easy application, such econometric approaches are
criticized for the absence of economics. Hence, their proper implementa-
tion should be based on theoretical reasoning.
Our paper positions itself in the second category. This is because the re-
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2. Some literature focuses on price variables (such as interest, GDP deflator, and exchange
rates) rather than these quantity variables.
sults from a general equilibrium setup are likely to be predetermined by the
parametric assumptions. In other words, the parametric structure of the
setup may exaggerate the relation between any pair of target variables in a
certain direction, which is either presumed or unknown for most cases. In
contrast, the econometric approach is relatively free from such an issue of
predetermination. Of course, the econometric approach is not perfectly ex-
empt from the contamination of biases. For example, a single-equation ap-
proach (Feldstein 1982, Kormendi 1983, and Lee and Sung 2005) should
come up with a proper strategy for eliminating the potential biases. Ac-
cordingly, our paper adopts a structural VAR setup, which is known to
avoid the endogeneity or simultaneity among the variables involved.
In this section, rather than display all the spectrum of the relevant liter-
ature aforementioned, we narrow down the scope to cover ones using a
VAR setup.3
3.2.1 Korean Literature
Several selections from the Korean literature, all of which disseminate
Korean fiscal and macro data with a VAR setup to evaluate the eﬀective-
ness of fiscal policy on the aggregate economy, are summarized in table 3.1.
Clearly, we can see that their results diverge in regard to the eﬀectiveness of
fiscal policy depending on the data sets and the choice of key variables.
Another notable point is that most of Korean literature using a VAR
setup rely only on the Cholesky decomposition for a shock-identifying strat-
egy. Admittedly, Cholesky decomposition is one of the most basic shock-
identification schemes in VAR, and so it cannot represent all the possible
contemporaneous relations among the disturbances. In this context, we
need to search for other shock-identifying strategies from the foreign lit-
erature on this issue and apply them to the available Korean fiscal data.
3.2.2 Foreign Literature
Most of the research on the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy adopts a struc-
tural VAR setup. According to De Castro and Hernandez de Cos (2006),
the literature using SVAR are categorized into four groups, as shown in
table 3.2, by diﬀerences in the fiscal shock-identifying strategies.4
Such popularity of SVAR lies in the fact that it is less dependent on the
existing economic theory and is less susceptible to the symptoms of endo-
geneity and cointegration among the variables of our interest.5 However,
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3. For the literature of other approaches, see Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz (2002).
4. Perotti (2004) classifies the SVAR literature into three groups. De Castro and Hernandez
de Cos (2006) add an additional group of the literature, which includes Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Perotti (2004).
5. Even when cointegrated relations exist among the key variables, the use of plain vanilla
VAR can still be advocated on the grounds that the parameters are estimated consistently and
the estimates have the same asymptotic distribution as those of diﬀerenced data (Hamilton
1994).
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the use of SVAR is more challenging in analyzing the fiscal policy than in
analyzing the monetary policy for several reasons, such as the existence of
uncertain or unidentifiable policy lags and the automatic stabilization
mechanism. These factors, combined with the low frequency of fiscal data
(mostly quarterly), cause technical diﬃculties in identifying sources of cor-
relations or causalities among the disturbances of the VAR system and dis-
entangling the contributions of the built-in stabilization mechanism. Thus,
the recent development in analyzing the fiscal policy using the VAR setup
naturally has been concentrated on handling those problems.
3.3 Methodology
Our model adopts a SVAR system based on Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and De Castro (2004). Accordingly, it emphasizes the design of a
shock-identification scheme so that it can allow more realistic contempo-
raneous relations among key variables in the SVAR equations.
Here we choose three key variables—real GDP (Yt ), government expen-
diture (Gt), and tax revenue (Tt ). All of them are logarized after being di-
vided by population size. A vector consisting of these three variables, Xt , is
assumed to follow a VAR system:
(1) Xt  A(L)Xt1  Dt  Ut , Xt   , Ut   
In the previous equation, each element of the vector Dt represents the
long-term trend of the corresponding variable, which is, in turn, assumed
tt
gt
yt
Tt
Gt
Yt
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Table 3.2 Various shock identification strategies adopted in measuring the
effectiveness of fiscal policy
Shock identification strategy
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, VAR models with dummy variables specifying 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) certain episodes (such as wars and drastic
changes in fiscal stance).
Mountford and Uhlig (2002) VAR with sign restrictions on the impulse 
response functions.
Fatas and Mihov (2000), Favero (2002), SVAR (Cholesky decomposition).
and De Castro (2004)
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti  SVAR using institutional information and 
(1999), and Hoppner (2002)a quarter dependence.
aHoppner (2002), following the shock representation by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), con-
centrates on distinguishing the direct effect of fiscal shock from the indirect effect of the
Automatic Stabilization Mechanism (ASM).
to have no influence on the long-term trends of the other variables. Such
long-run independence among the variables indicates our implicit as-
sumption that there is no long-run eﬀect of fiscal measures on GDP. Thus,
our model is focused on evaluating the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy not in
terms of raising the long-run economic growth but in terms of controlling
the short-term fluctuations.
Before discussing further the detrending procedure, we have to consider
that all the components in Xt tend to have seasonality. Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002) introduce quarterly dependency to the estimation of A(L) in a
form of A(L, q) instead of using seasonally adjusted data. Depending on
the number of observations available, the use of the quarterly dependent
version of equation (1) could be considered. Otherwise, a usual method of
eliminating the seasonality, such as X-12, could be applied.
So far the VAR system in equation (1) has not been fully specified. De-
tailed assumptions on the disturbance term Ut as well as the long-term
trend Dt are added as follows. To begin with, two types of detrending pro-
cedures are taken in the paper. One is linearly detrending with respect to
time (XLD) and the other is detrending by Hodrick-Prescott filtered data
(XDHP ).
Xt
LD  Xt  Dt, XtDHP  Xt  XtHP
By plugging XLD or XDHP, we represent the VAR system of equation (1)
in a neat way.
(2) Xt
DHP  A(L)Xt1
DHP  Ut
Xt
LD  A(L)XLDt1  Ut
The long-term time trend Dt disappears in equation (2) because the vec-
tors XLD and XDHP are consisting of detrended variables.
Second, our paper tries three diﬀerent specifications on the disturbance
term Ut . A general form of Ut could be represented as follows ([e
t
t , et
g, et
y] are
orthogonal to each other):
(3)          
Due to identifiability, equation (3) requires additional restrictions on the
coeﬃcients. As special cases of the previous equation, we consider Cholesky
decomposition (in various combinations of ordering variables) and two
identification strategies exploiting institutional information.
First, the Cholesky decomposition restricts the coeﬃcients of equation
(3) in the following way (for example, in the order of tax revenue, expendi-
ture, and GDP):
ett
e t
g
e t
y
1 a2 a3
b1 1 b3
c1 c2 1
tt
gt
yt
0 2 3
1 0 3
1 2 0
tt
gt
yt
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(4)          
Identification of shocks by Cholesky decomposition, though easy to use,
is vulnerable to change in the order of decomposition, which is usually ar-
bitrarily set.6 Therefore, in the case of using the Cholesky decomposition
without any prior information about the structure of shocks, all the prob-
able combinations of shock orderings should be tested and compared for
robustness check.7
Another problematic feature of Cholesky decomposition lies in that it
defines the contemporaneous relation among the disturbance term Ut only
in a recursive way. Accordingly, nonrecursively structured contemporane-
ous relations could not be identified by the Cholesky decomposition. Fur-
thermore, the misspecification of the contemporaneous relation results in
an imprecise estimation of impulse responses both in terms of sign and
magnitude.
Second, as a typical example of institutional identification strategies, we
adopt Blanchard and Perotti (B-P; 2002), whose shock identification is
represented as
(5)          
Equation (5) reduces the number of parameters to estimate by borrowing
the information on the GDP (or tax base) elasticities of tax revenue (3)
from external sources. In addition, B-P assume the GDP shock has no con-
temporaneous impact on the government spending (3  0). Then, they di-
vide equation (5) into two cases by setting a2  0, or b1  0, alternatively.
The third identification strategy, which also depends on the institutional
information, borrows the restrictions on 1 and 3 (  0) from the budget
data in addition to 3, based on the almost common perception that the
government of Korea has kept the principle of “Expenditure within Rev-
enue” since the 1980s (Koh 2002 and Lee and Kim 2004).8 Due to the long
ett
e t
g
e t
y
1 a2 0
b1 1 0
0 0 1
tt
gt
yt
0 0 3
0 0 3
1 2 0
tt
gt
yt
ett
e t
g
e t
y
1 0 0
b1 1 0
c1 c2 1
tt
gt
yt
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
tt
gt
yt
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6. In most cases shock ordering is determined by the Granger causality test. However, the
test itself is very vulnerable to permitted number of lags. Furthermore, it cannot put shocks
in order when the causality holds in both directions between any pair of the variables.
7. De Castro (2004) analyzes a five-variable VAR model with varying orders of Cholesky
decomposition. The five variables include price and interest rate in addition to GDP, govern-
ment spending, and tax revenue. Due to the inclusion of the price variables, the five-variable
setup could examine the crowding-out eﬀect revealed on them.
8. Quoted from Koh (2002): “One important principle in fiscal management was estab-
lished in this period. It was the principle of ‘Expenditure within Revenue,’ or the balanced
tradition of balanced budget, the level of expenditure still tends to be de-
termined within the revenue forecasts. Exploiting such fiscal conservatism,
we assign a restriction on 1 by running a regression of expenditure incre-
ment on tax revenue increase and borrowing the coeﬃcient thereof. Com-
pared with previous identification strategies, the third one highlights the
contemporaneous relation in the disturbance term Ut .
(6)          
In the next section we report the results from applying equations (4)
through (6) to equation (2) sequentially. Impulse-response functions are es-
timated with their 95 percent confidence intervals.9 By comparing the re-
sults derived from diﬀerent contemporaneous relations among the shocks,
we could check the robustness of the SVAR models.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Data
Our empirical works are based on the data in Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
published by Bank of Korea. The data set includes the period from 1979Q1
to 2000Q4. However, its time coverage cannot be extended beyond year
2000 because, as of 2001, the Korean government introduced a new fiscal
information system based on the consolidated budget, which is not com-
patible with the old data. Furthermore, the new data set of consolidated
budget is not back-dated prior to 1994. Though the concept of consolidated
budget seems more appropriate for the purpose of our research, we choose
the Bank of Korea data for their relatively long span of time series.
Figure 3.1 draws the past trends of the government expenditure, tax rev-
enue, and GDP, all of which are measured in logarized per capita real
terms. It shows all the three variables tend to follow certain time trends. In
addition, though not apparent in the figure, we observe that strong sea-
sonality is present in all of the three variables. Thus, we process the data by
eliminating seasonality (X-12) and the long-term time trend (linear time
trend or H-P filtered) sequentially.
In order to check the presence of nonstationarity, Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) unit root tests are done for the variables, which are already
seasonally adjusted and detrended (X LD, X DHP ). The tests report that only
ett
e t
g
e t
y
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
tt
gt
yt
0 2 3
1 0 3
1 2 0
tt
gt
yt
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budget principle. While not formalized in a law or a regulation, it acted as self-discipline im-
posed on the budget authorities against imprudent management of the budget.”
9. The confidence level of 95 percent is used because it is a sort of academic norm. How-
ever, when the results are reflected on policy making, the level of 95 percent may not be taken
as a golden rule.
the linearly detrended Yt (the logarized per capita real GDP) seems to fol-
low I(1).10
3.4.2 Results
Tested models have in common that all the variables used are logarized
and their diﬀerences denote change rates of the corresponding variables.
Accordingly, the values of impulse responses denote the GDP growth rates
over a certain period following an innovation (of a certain magnitude) in
the growth rate of tax revenue, or expenditure, or GDP itself.
In addition, the size of innovation to be applied in calculating an impulse
response function is set to be 1 standard deviation of each error term in 
(ett , e t
g, e t
y ). Hence, the elasticity of per capita GDP with respect to either
of the fiscal stimuli is defined to be the ratio of log GDP change (GDP
growth rate) to the sample standard deviation of the corresponding inno-
vation term (the change rate of the relevant fiscal variable).
Considering that the current government expenditure and tax revenue in
Korea is roughly 25 to 30 percent of GDP in size, we can convert the elas-
ticity of per capita GDP to fiscal stimulus into a usual fiscal multiplier by
multiplying 3 or 4 to the elasticity.
Lag orders used in the VAR estimations are set to four, as is selected by
Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC). The lag order of 4 is quite common
in other literature using quarterly data, such as Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and De Castro (2004).
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10. Rothenberg and Stock (1997) show that the coeﬃcients of a VAR system estimated by
OLS are consistent even though some level variables follow I(1).
Fig. 3.1 Trends of government expenditure, tax revenue, and GDP (quarterly data
from 1979Q1–2000Q4)
Cholesky Decomposition
Table 3.3 summarizes the estimation results of equation (4) in the order
of tax revenue, government expenditure, and real GDP with the linearly
detrended data. Dividing the responses of GDP to the impulses of tax rev-
enue and the government spending in table 3.3 by the estimated sample
standard deviations of innovation terms (ett , e t
g, e t
y )  (0.085, 0.058, 0.016),
we can obtain the elasticities of GDP with respect to fiscal stimuli, which
can be in turn converted into series of fiscal multipliers. Figure 3.2 draws
impulse-response functions for all the three variables.
According to table 3.3, impulse responses of GDP have significantly
negative values for the sixth to tenth quarters after a shock in tax revenue.
On the other hand, impulse responses to an expenditure shock hold signif-
icantly negative signs up to the third quarter. By dividing them first by (ett ,
e t
g )  (0.085, 0.058) each and multiply them by 3 to 4 next, we can convert
these significant estimates of impulse responses to fiscal multipliers.11 The
accumulated fiscal multipliers of tax revenue and government spending
(up to 10 quarters) are about –2 ~ –1.5 and 1.2 ~ 1.6.12 Though these num-
bers seem plausible in terms of signs and magnitudes, they are based on the
estimates for c1 and c2, which interpret the contemporaneous relations be-
tween tt , gt and yt imprecisely.
13 Therefore, the results in table 3.3 should not
be heavily relied on.
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Table 3.3 Impulse-response functions of key variables (linearly detrended) by
Cholesky ordering (in the order of tax revenue, expenditures, GDP)
Quarter OIRF(1) Lower(1) Upper(1) OIRF(2) Lower(2) Upper(2)
0 0.0034 –0.0001 0.0068 0.0042 0.0009 0.0076
1 0.0011 –0.0037 0.0058 0.0054 0.0008 0.0101
2 –0.0013 –0.0073 0.0047 0.0067 0.0011 0.0123
3 –0.0033 –0.0102 0.0037 0.0075 0.0010 0.0141
4 –0.0049 –0.0121 0.0023 0.0042 –0.0027 0.0112
5 –0.0064 –0.0139 0.0010 0.0038 –0.0036 0.0113
6 –0.0084 –0.0160 –0.0008 0.0031 –0.0046 0.0108
7 –0.0089 –0.0167 –0.0011 0.0021 –0.0059 0.0100
8 –0.0087 –0.0166 –0.0008 0.0016 –0.0065 0.0096
9 –0.0088 –0.0168 –0.0008 0.0011 –0.0071 0.0093
10 –0.0088 –0.0169 –0.0008 0.0003 –0.0080 0.0087
Notes: 95 percent lower and upper bounds reported. (1) impulse = tax revenue, and 
response = GDP. (2) impulse = expenditures, and response = GDP.
11. An accumulated fiscal multiplier is the sum of fiscal multipliers up to the current period.
12. Here an accumulated fiscal multiplier is defined to be the sum of impulse responses,
which reject a null hypothesis of zero value with 5 percent significance.
13. Especially the estimate for c1 holds a positive sign, which implies that tax revenue in-
crease has positive contemporaneous impact on GDP. However, it would be more appropri-
ate to assume that GDP increase has positive contemporaneous impact on tax revenue,
whereas tax increase has negative contemporaneous impact on GDP.
Table 3.4 summarizes the estimation results of equation (4) with the data
detrended by H-P filter. In this case, the responses of GDP to the impulses
of tax revenue and the government spending are either very small or statis-
tically insignificant.14 Figure 3.3 draws impulse-response functions for all
the three variables.
In table 3.4 impulse responses of GDP have significantly positive signs
for the first two quarters following a shock in tax revenue, while impulse re-
sponses to an expenditure shock hold significantly positive signs up to the
second quarter and significantly negative signs for the sixth and seventh
quarters. The positive eﬀects of tax revenue increase as well as the negative
eﬀects of government expenditure increase on GDP are contrary to our
general notion of Keynesianism. The accumulated fiscal multipliers of tax
revenue and government expenditure range in 0.3 ~ 0.5 and 0.03 ~ 0.05 re-
spectively. However, as in the previous case, these numbers are based on the
imprecise estimates for c1 and c2. Therefore, the results in table 3.4 should
not be heavily relied on, either.
The previous two cases of Cholesky decomposition are done in the or-
der of tax revenue, government expenditure, and GDP. As for other pos-
sible combinations of shock ordering, we find the impulse-response func-
tions diverging not only in their sign and size but also in their timing of
eﬀects and statistical significance.
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14. For this case, the estimated sample standard deviations of innovation terms are (ett , e t
g,
e t
y )  (0.077, 0.056, 0.013).
Fig. 3.2 Impulse-response functions of key variables (linearly detrended) by
Cholesky ordering (in the order of tax revenue, expenditures, GDP)
Identification by Using Institutional Information (B-P [2002])
B-P (2002), based on equation (5), borrow institutional information on
3 from the calculation of GDP or tax bases elasticities of tax revenues. The
additional restrictions, such as 3  a2  0 or 3  b1  0, seem rather ar-
bitrary. While repeating the same procedure as in B-P (2002), we adopt the
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Table 3.4 Impulse-response functions of interest variables (detrended by H-P filter)
by Cholesky ordering (in the order of tax revenue, expenditure, GDP)
Quarter OIRF(1) Lower(1) Upper(1) OIRF(2) Lower(2) Upper(2)
0 0.0053 0.0023 0.0082 0.0039 0.0011 0.0067
1 0.0042 0.0005 0.0080 0.0038 0.0002 0.0074
2 0.0033 –0.0010 0.0077 0.0025 –0.0017 0.0067
3 0.0027 –0.0019 0.0072 0.0020 –0.0024 0.0065
4 0.0022 –0.0024 0.0067 –0.0023 –0.0068 0.0022
5 0.0002 –0.0031 0.0035 –0.0025 –0.0064 0.0013
6 –0.0013 –0.0039 0.0014 –0.0034 –0.0068 –0.0001
7 –0.0019 –0.0044 0.0006 –0.0036 –0.0067 –0.0006
8 –0.0017 –0.0043 0.0009 –0.0025 –0.0051 0.0001
9 –0.0014 –0.0039 0.0011 –0.0016 –0.0040 0.0009
10 –0.0009 –0.0032 0.0013 –0.0006 –0.0030 0.0018
Note: See table 3.3 notes.
Fig. 3.3 Impulse-response functions of interest variables (detrended by H-P filter)
by Cholesky ordering (in the order of tax revenue, expenditure, GDP)
elasticities of tax revenues in Korea from Park and Park (2002) and assign
3  1.09.
15
Table 3.5 shows the estimation results of the contemporaneous eﬀects
using the residuals of the VAR systems in equation (2). The signs of con-
temporaneous eﬀects of innovations in tax revenues and spending on the
disturbance of GDP (1 and 2) are consistent with our anticipation that
tax increase reduces GDP while spending spurs it.
Table 3.6 compares the indirect contemporaneous eﬀect of the automatic
stabilization mechanism (ASM) and the direct contemporaneous eﬀect of
discretionary fiscal policy. The direct contemporaneous eﬀects of fiscal in-
novations are measured by the estimates of 1 and 2. However, the changes
in GDP influences back the tax revenue and the government spending in the
form of tt and/or gt, from which the ASM takes over. Summing up the direct
and the indirect contemporaneous eﬀects, we obtain the value of total con-
temporaneous eﬀect following an innovation in the fiscal sector.
From table 3.6, we see that the positive indirect contemporaneous eﬀects
of the ASM dominates the negative direct impact of discretionary fiscal im-
pulse in the case of tax shocks and a2  0, while the direct eﬀect of a spend-
ing shock is always greater than the indirect eﬀect of the ASM followed.
In times of nonintervention, it is known that the built-in ASM smoothes
out the fluctuation of a business cycle and reduces the need for government
intervention. But in times of government intervention, the presence of the
ASM works as friction against a policy maker, who intends to resize his or
her fiscal programs for the purpose of controlling the business cycle. The
results from table 3.6 indicate that the adjustment in tax has more to lose
than to win, at least contemporaneously, once it is used, whereas that in the
government spending still maintains its validity as intended.
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15. Park and Park use the consolidated budget data from 1991 to 2002 (annual). They clas-
sify the current tax revenues in Korea in four groups (income tax, corporate tax, indirect tax,
and social security contribution) and calculate the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to tax
base for each group. 3  1.09 is the weighted average of the four tax elasticities by the pro-
portion of tax revenues to GDP.
Table 3.5 Estimation of contemporaneous effect (3 = 1.09 and 3 = 0)
γ1 γ2 a2(b1 = 0) b1(a2 = 0)
A Linearly detrended
Estimate –0.086*** 0.129*** 0.659*** 0.656***
t-value –2.73 4.03 7.90 7.90
B. Detrended by H-P filter
Estimate –0.037*** 0.110*** 0.603*** 0.655***
t-value –1.37 4.1 7.32 7.32
***Significance level of less than 1 percent.
Figures 3.4–3.9 display the impulse-response functions of GDP with re-
spect to tax revenue, government expenditure, and GDP, using the linearly
detrended data, while figures 3.10–3.15 display the impulse-response func-
tions using the data detrended by H-P filter. Comparing these two groups
of figures, we infer that the linear time trend may detect (or exaggerate) the
persistence of the fiscal shocks on GDP treatment of long-term trends,
whereas H-P filter detrending may miss (or underestimate) the persistence.
Especially, the persistence of tax revenue on GDP varies drastically de-
pending on the treatment of long-term trends.16
Whichever detrending method may be taken, the figures of impulse re-
sponses show that the positive eﬀect of expenditure policy is statistically
significant only in the very short run (no longer than three quarters). On
the other hand, the eﬀect of tax increase is not significant in any case. Con-
verted into fiscal multipliers, even the significant impulse responses have
very small magnitudes less than 0.4. Hence, the eﬀectiveness of fiscal pol-
icy is not confirmed under B-P identification strategy.17
Identification by Using “Expenditure within Revenue” Principle
The third identification strategy (6) borrows the restrictions on 1 ( 0.598)
from the government budget data in addition to 3, based on the percep-
tion of the “Expenditure within Revenue (EWR)” rule prevalent in the
1980s and 1990s in Korea. This identification strategy diﬀers from B-P
(2002) in that it allows contemporaneous duplex relation between xt and gt.
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Table 3.6 Decomposition of contemporaneous effects as a sum of the direct effect
from discretionary policy and the indirect effect from automatic
stabilization mechanism (ASM; 3 = 1.09 and 3 = 0)
a2 = 0 b1 = 0
Tax Spending Tax Spending
A. Linearly detrended
Discretionary policy –0.086 0.129 –0.086 0.129
ASM 0.087 –0.016 0.012 –0.064
Contemporaneous effects 0.001 0.113 –0.074 0.065
B. Detrended by H-P filter
Discretionary policy –0.037 0.110 –0.037 0.110
ASM 0.081 –0.014 0.018 –0.025
Contemporaneous effects 0.044 0.096 –0.019 0.085
16. Tax policy seems to have more persistent eﬀect on GDP than revenue policy under the
linear time trend, which tends to leave the nonlinear long-term trend. Accordingly, it remains
a question whether the tax policy influences the long-term GDP growth or the nonlinear long-
term trends of tax and GDP incidentally commove in a linear way.
17. Disregarding the 95 percent confidence interval and focusing on the fitted line of the
impulse responses, we could have obtained the high value of accumulated fiscal multipliers in
figure 3.4, figure 3.7, and figure 3.8.
Fig. 3.4 Impulse responses of GDP to tax revenue estimated by B-P (2002;
linearly detrended and setting b1  0)
Fig. 3.5 Impulse responses of GDP to expenditure estimated by B-P (2002;
linearly detrended and setting b1  0)
Fig. 3.6 Impulse responses of GDP on GDP estimated by B-P (2002; linearly
detrended and setting b1  0)
Fig. 3.7 Impulse responses of GDP to tax revenue estimated by B-P (2002;
linearly detrended and setting a2  0)
Fig. 3.8 Impulse responses of GDP to expenditure estimated by B-P (2002;
linearly detrended and setting a2  0)
Fig. 3.9 Impulse responses of GDP on GDP estimated by B-P (2002; linearly
detrended and setting a2  0)
Fig. 3.10 Impulse responses of GDP to tax revenue estimated by B-P (2002;
detrended by H-P filter and setting b1  0)
Fig. 3.11 Impulse responses of GDP to expenditure estimated by B-P (2002;
detrended by H-P filter and setting b1  0)
Fig. 3.12 Impulse responses of GDP on GDP estimated by B-P (2002; detrended
by H-P filter and setting b1  0)
Fig. 3.13 Impulse responses of GDP to tax revenue estimated by B-P (2002; de-
trended by H-P filter and setting a2  0)
Fig. 3.14 Impulse responses of GDP to expenditure estimated by B-P (2002; de-
trended by H-P filter and setting a2  0)
Fig. 3.15 Impulse responses of GDP on GDP estimated by B-P (2002; detrended
by H-P filter and setting a2  0)
Instead it restricts that the errors of the disturbances, (ett, et
g, et
y), should be
orthogonal to each other.
Table 3.7 reports the estimated contemporaneous eﬀects of fiscal distur-
bances on GDP. The signs of the direct contemporaneous eﬀects (1 and
2) are consistent with those in table 3.5. For both detrending methods, the
contemporaneous eﬀects from the ASM are much greater than those of the
discretionary tax shocks (table 3.8), which is opposite to the case of spend-
ing shocks. Such prevailing eﬀect of the ASM, which works against the in-
tended direction of discretionary revenue policy, is consistent with Keyne-
sian wisdom that tax multiplier is smaller than that of spending.
Figures 3.16–3.18 draw the impulse responses of GDP to tax revenue,
expenditure, and GDP with the linearly detrended data, and figures 3.19–
3.21 draw the impulse responses with the data detrended by H-P filter.
Some notable points from the figures are as follows. First, increasing
spending has a significantly positive eﬀect on GDP for the first 3 to 5 quar-
ters regardless of a detrending method (though their magnitudes are also
negligible when converted into fiscal multipliers). Second, tax increase has
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Table 3.7 Estimation of contemporaneous effect (3 = 1.09, 2 = 0, 1 = 0.598, 
2 = 0)
γ1 γ2
A. Linearly detrended
Estimate –0.056* 0.082***
t-value –1.84 2.67
B. Detrended by H-P filter
Estimate –0.014 0.075**
t-value –0.55 2.86
***Significance level of less than 1 percent.
**Significance level of less than 5 percent.
*Significance level of less than 10 percent.
Table 3.8 Decomposition of contemporaneous effects as a sum of the direct effect
from discretionary policy and the indirect effect from automatic
stabilization mechanism (ASM; 3 = 1.09, 2 = 0, 1 = 0.598, 2 = 0)
Tax Spending
A. Linearly detrended
Discretionary policy –0.056 0.082
ASM 0.062 –0.076
Contemporaneous effects 0.006 0.006
B. Detrended by H-P filter
Discretionary policy –0.014 0.075
ASM 0.022 –0.070
Contemporaneous effects 0.008 0.005
Fig. 3.16 Impulse responses of GDP to tax revenue estimated by alternative insti-
tutional identifying restrictions (linearly detrended)
Fig. 3.17 Impulse responses of GDP to expenditure estimated by alternative insti-
tutional identifying restrictions (linearly detrended)
Fig. 3.18 Impulse responses of GDP on GDP estimated by alternative institu-
tional identifying restrictions (linearly detrended)
Fig. 3.19 Impulse responses of GDP to tax revenue estimated by alternative insti-
tutional identifying restrictions (detrended by H-P filter)
Fig. 3.20 Impulse responses of GDP to expenditure estimated by alternative insti-
tutional identifying restrictions (detrended by H-P filter)
Fig. 3.21 Impulse responses of GDP on GDP estimated by alternative institu-
tional identifying restrictions (detrended by H-P filter)
a positive eﬀect (very short lived), which is opposite to our anticipation. As
previously mentioned, it can be attributed to the dominant contempora-
neous eﬀect of the ASM. Furthermore, it seems that the persistence of the
counteractive eﬀect from the ASM dilutes the negative eﬀect of tax in-
crease on GDP over a long horizon, leading to insignificant fiscal impulses.
So far we have considered various identification strategies starting from
usual Cholesky decomposition in this section. Their results show diﬀerent
predictions on the eﬀects from discretionary fiscal policy not only in terms
of magnitudes but also in terms of signs. Though most of them confirm
that the expansionary fiscal stance (whether it is tax cut or spending spree)
has expansionary eﬀect on the economy, we cannot believe that this
demonstrates the eﬀectiveness of the fiscal policy considering most of the
95 percent significance intervals cover both negative and positive ranges.
3.4.3 Results from 4 Variable VARs Allowing Outside Shocks
In this section we check whether there exist omitted variables and if their
inclusion would determine the signs of eﬀects between fiscal variables and
business cycle.
Considering the trade dependence of the Korean economy, we infer that
shocks of foreign origination may have critical impacts on the Korean
economy, which will result in diﬀerent estimations of impulse-response
functions. Hence, we select the per capita real GDP of US(Yt
US in loga-
rithms) and the real eﬀective exchange rate of Korean currency (logarized
REER) for the most critical omitted variables and we add these two vari-
ables to the estimation of (2) one by one.18 The importance of the U.S. econ-
omy in determining the growth path of the Korean economy is needless to
say. REER is included because its time path has been very responsive to the
past economic turmoils including the recent currency crisis.19
Shock-identification strategies for the new set of four-variable VAR sys-
tems take a dual approach, which maintains (4) through (6) among the
existing three variables and requires Cholesky decomposition between a
newly introduced variable for external shocks and the vector of the exist-
ing variables.
Table 3.9 summarizes the estimation results of the four-variable VAR sys-
tems in terms of elasticities (both one period and accumulated).20 The elas-
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18. In addition to them, we try the Terms Of Trade (TOT) as an exogenous variable to equa-
tion (2). However, the previous results stay unchanged.
19. Following Ramey and Shapiro (1998), the VAR literature treats certain economic
episodes with dummies. However, this way of identifying structural breaks is not appropriate
for our analysis because the end point of the data set (2000 Q4) is not far enough from the
starting point of the Korean currency crisis (1997 Q4). In this situation, REER can be sub-
stituted for a dummy of the currency crisis.
20. Divided by the proportion of government expenditure or revenue to GDP, these elas-
ticities are easily converted into the fiscal multipliers (in the unit of Korean currency). Though
it varies year by year, the proportion of government expenditure or revenue to GDP is ap-
proximately 25 to 30 percent. Thus, the fiscal multipliers will be approximately three to four
times of the elasticities in table 3.9.
ticities are calculated by dividing the impulse-response functions by the stan-
dard deviations of the corresponding orthogonalized disturbance terms et
x,
ett, et
g, and et
y. Then the elasticities are recorded only when their signs are sta-
tistically significant in 95 percent confidence intervals. Groups (I) and (III)
describe the results from running the VAR model with the linearly detrended
data while groups (II) and (IV) deal with the data detrended by H-P filter. In
the meantime, groups (I) and (II) include the real per capita GDP of US 
in log scale as a measure for the exogenous shock whereas groups (III) and
(IV) use the logarized REER instead. In each group, the four-identification
strategies, which are defined in the previous section, are dealt with.
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Table 3.9 The elasticities of real GDP to the shocks from various sources
Shock External Revenue Expenditure
Group identification Elasticity shock (tax) shock shock
I Cholesky One period n.a. n.a. 0.086(0)
decomposition Accumulated n.a. n.a. 0.153(0~1)
BP(2002): One period n.a. 0.043(1) 0.137(2)
a2 = 0 Accumulated n.a. 0.081(0~1) 0.3840(0~2)
BP(2002): One period n.a. –0.170(3) n.a.
b1 = 0 Accumulated n.a. –1.745(0~13) n.a.
EWR One period n.a. –0.131(7) 0.094(1)
Accumulated n.a. –1.492(0~17) 0.171(0~1)
II Cholesky One period n.a. n.a. 0.069(0)
decomposition Accumulated n.a. n.a. 0.135(0~1)
BP(2002): One period n.a. 0.042(0) 0.107(0)
a2 = 0 Accumulated n.a. 0.042(0) 0.199(0~1)
BP(2002): One period n.a. –0.044(0) 0.079(0)
b1 = 0 Accumulated n.a. –0.078(0~1) 0.151(0~1)
EWR One period n.a. n.a. 0.078(0)
Accumulated n.a. n.a. 0.152(0~1)
III Cholesky One period –0.283(2) n.a. 0.068(0)
decomposition Accumulated –1.316(0~5) n.a. 0.068(0)
BP(2002): One period –0.283(2) 0.053(0) 0.097(0)
a2 = 0 Accumulated –1.316(0~5) 0.249(0~3) 0.097(0)
BP(2002): One period –0.283(2) –0.125(2) n.a.
b1 = 0 Accumulated –1.317(0~5) –1.848(0~24) n.a.
EWR One period –0.277(2) n.a. 0.070(0)
Accumulated –1.102(0~4) n.a. 0.070(0)
IV Cholesky One period –0.203(1) 0.043(0) 0.071(0)
decomposition Accumulated –0.659(0~3) 0.043(0) 0.071(0)
BP(2002): One period –0.203(1) 0.060(0) 0.095(0)
a2 = 0 Accumulated –0.659(0~3) 0.116(0~1) 0.095(0)
BP(2002): One period –0.203(1) –0.048(1) 0.072(0)
b1 = 0 Accumulated –0.659(0~3) –0.142(0~3) 0.072(0)
EWR One period –0.198(1) n.a. 0.072(0)
Accumulated –0.638(0~3) n.a. 0.072(0)
Note: All numbers in parentheses denote the corresponding quarter(s) to the elasticities on the left.
Compared with the previous three-variable VAR setup, the following
points are notable in the results from the four-variable VAR. First, the sig-
nificance of fiscal stimulus in boosting the economy has been enhanced
overall regardless of the origination of the shock (either from the revenue
or expenditure of the government). The increased significance of the fiscal
impact can be attributed to the inclusion of the new variables (real per
capita GDP of the United States and REER), which eliminate noises in the
real per capita GDP of Korea.
Second, however, the magnitudes of the fiscal multipliers (which will be
approximately 3 to 4 times of the elasticities) still remain small. Out of the
16 cases in table 3.7, only three cases report the accumulated fiscal multi-
pliers greater than 1 for a revenue shock and one case for an expenditure
shock.21 Since these four exceptions deal with the linearly detrended data
in common, it is inferred that the linear detrending may not be satisfactory
to catch the nonlinear time trend of the real GDP. Combined with the lin-
ear detrending, it seems that the B-P (2002) identification strategy of set-
ting b1  0 emphasizes or exaggerates the transmission channels of a rev-
enue shock.
Third, the persistence of fiscal stimuli is very short lived and cannot last
longer than three quarters, except the three cases, all of which respond to
a revenue shock. This persistence issue also seems to be linked to the selec-
tion of a detrending method.
Summing up, we see that the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy is significantly
enhanced by introducing external shocks. However, in most cases the mag-
nitudes of the fiscal multipliers and the duration of eﬀectiveness are small or
short lived, which are violated only when the linear detrending is adopted.
3.4.4 Robustness of the Results to Other Variations in Specification
The previous tested models are based on several restrictions, which are,
we may suspect, possible causes of driving fiscal policy ineﬀectiveness.
Among the restrictions, we are particularly interested in comprehending
whether the selection of diﬀerent lag orders, sample periods and filters as
well as diﬀerencing some nonstationary variables, would confirm the eﬀec-
tiveness of fiscal policies.
First, we elect other criteria of lag orders. Previously, lag orders were se-
lected by Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC). According to Lutkepohl
(1993), the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) provides consistent esti-
mates of the true lag order, whereas minimizing the AIC tends to overesti-
mate the true lag order. The use of BIC to the Korean data suggests the lag
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21. The arbitrarily set criterion for the accumulated fiscal multiplier is 1. To maintain 
the budget balance after a fiscal expansion, the accumulated fiscal multiplier should exceed 
1/(  Tax_revenue/GDP), so called a balanced budget fiscal multiplier. Considering that 
  0.25 in Korea, the balanced budget fiscal multipliers should be about four. In table 3.4,
only three cases of revenue shocks report fiscal multipliers greater than four. For the rest of
the cases fiscal expansion will aggravate the fiscal consolidation.
of one, which is much smaller than the lag of four prescribed by AIC. Thus,
we run the previously defined VAR setup with the reduced lag of one. How-
ever, these results also fail in confirming the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy.
Second, we introduce a dummy variable, which discerns the sample pe-
riods in two parts—before and after a currency crisis in late 1997. Even
with the currency crisis dummy included, the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policies
cannot be significantly identified.22
Third, we adopt the Baxter and King’s (1995) band pass filter instead of
the H-P filter. The replacement of the detrending filter does not change the
results of policy ineﬀectiveness.23
Fourth, in order to handle the nonstationarity of some variables, we take
a routine measure of diﬀerencing all the variables or the real GDP only.
Another option we choose is to investigate possible cointegration among
the series and take a vector error correction form accordingly (Hamilton
1994). However, in either of them expansionary eﬀects of fiscal stimuli are
not confirmed.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Summing up, our paper has shown that the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy
is not significantly identified in Korea regardless of policy measures, tax
reduction, or spending increase, or of methods of identifying shocks.24
Though significantly identified in some cases, the eﬀect from the fiscal pol-
icy is either very small in magnitude or it phases out very quickly or it is
caused by linear detrending.25 Such a low contribution of fiscal policy in
economic stabilization provides many points to ponder in steering the fu-
ture research on this issue.26
There are various ways of explaining the low performance of fiscal pol-
icy as a vehicle of boosting Korean economy. The first and easiest guess
would be to accept the new classical argument. However, the question of
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22. The BOK data set ends in the fourth quarter of 2000 and the number of observations
after the currency crisis is very small. Accordingly, we compare the results from the consoli-
dated budget data, which cover the period from 1994 to 2005 Q2 for cross-check.
23. In this case the confidence intervals are not shrinking along the passage of time.
24. Lee and Sung (2005) compare the estimators for the fiscal responsiveness of Korea to
GDP shocks from OLS and IV estimation, and they report that both estimators are almost
identical. Their results, mainly intended to eliminate the estimation bias for the fiscal respon-
siveness, can be interpreted to imply indirectly that fiscal expansion has no substantial eﬀect
on GDP.
25. In applying Cholesky decomposition, there are some cases in which the substantial
eﬀects of fiscal stimuli are significantly identified. Even in those cases, the estimates for the
fiscal multipliers are based on the imprecise identification of contemporaneous relations
among the shocks. Remember that in the estimation of the four variable SVARs, all the four
cases, which have fiscal multipliers greater than one, use the linearly detrended data.
26. The use of consolidated budget data instead of the BOK data cannot support the eﬀec-
tiveness of fiscal policy, either.
why the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy that is confirmed in other countries is
refuted in the case of Korea still remains unsolved.27
The second guess is that there may not exist one-to-one correspondence
between fiscal stance and the transition of a business cycle, such as match-
ing fiscal expansion with booming or fiscal tightening with landing. In
other words, there may be nonlinearity between fiscal measures and busi-
ness cycles. Or there may exist an omitted and unobservable variable, the
value of which changes the relationship between the fiscal variables and
GDP. In such circumstances, the VAR models would not be able to detect
the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy even if it is eﬀective.28
Anyway, our paper comes to the findings, which are exactly opposite to
the generally accepted Keynesian theory. Even so, it is still too early to re-
place it with the new classical theory. For example, Ricardian equivalence
is an example of fiscal policy ineﬀectiveness. It does not cover all the trans-
mission channels of fiscal policies, which our VAR setup evaluates in sum.
In contrast, our setup does not identify exactly how the Ricardian equiva-
lence argument works in an economy. Therefore, based on the achieve-
ments made by this paper, it is more desirable to continue our research in
both of the following directions: verifying other possible transmission
mechanisms of fiscal policies theoretically and comparing jointly their
magnitudes of influence on the macro economy empirically.
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Comment Wei Li
The objective of Dr. Hur’s paper is to estimate the impact of fiscal policy in
Korea. To achieve this goal, Dr. Hur uses quarterly GDP, government rev-
enue, and spending data between 1979:Q1 and 2000:Q4 and estimates
structural VAR models. The paper’s methodology follows those in Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004), among others. In one of the
SVAR models, it utilizes Korean institutional features—namely, the fiscal
principle of expenditure within revenue—to impose identification restric-
tions. The author finds that estimated fiscal multipliers are in general small
using a three variable—GDP, revenue, and spending—SVAR model, but
they are larger when a fourth exogenous variable—U.S. GDP or the Real
Eﬀective Exchange Rate—is added. One note on presentation: It would be
more informative if the impulse responses were transformed to report the
Korean won response of each variable to a won shock to one of the fiscal
variables—the conventional measure of a fiscal multiplier.
Before discussing the models and the data, let me first review the general
economic environment in Korea during the sample period. Between 1979
and 2000, Korea underwent rapid economic transformation. In 1979, the
first year in the sample, per capita GDP was $3,322 in constant 2000 U.S.
dollars and agriculture contributed to 21 percent of GDP (World Bank
2006). By 2000, the end year in the sample, per capita GDP more than
tripled to $10,884, and the contribution of agriculture to GDP fell to only
5 percent. The country’s tax system also underwent structural changes.
Based on data from the University of Michigan World Tax Database (2006)
revenue collected from taxes on international trade and transfers fell from
19 percent of total revenue in 1979 to 7 percent in 1997, while tax revenue
as a proportion of GDP increased only marginally from 15 percent to 16
percent. The data also show that the top personal income tax rate was cut
from 89.25 percent in 1979 to 40 percent in 1997, during which personal in-
come tax comprised 14.6 percent of total tax revenue in 1979 and 19.0 per-
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